

**SECRET**

TAB G

CRITERIA FOR MULTILATERAL  
US-UK-YUGOSLAV-SPONSORED COUP IN ALBANIA

ESSENTIAL

DESIRABLE

1. State Department for overt actions and CIA for covert actions to complete negotiations as follows:

a. With Great Britain:

(1) Concurrence in full with plan of action on basis of detailed revelation.

(2) Agreement to support and participate in all international negotiations required.

(3) Agreement to joint diplomatic support of coup with U.S., by recognition of provisional Albanian government as soon as established.

(4) Agreement to consider specific operational aid if operational plans develop need therefor.

b. With Yugoslavia:

(1) Yugoslavia to order merger of Prizren League with NCFA, the resulting group to remain under joint U.S.-Yugoslav control.

(2) Agreement that NCFA (including Prizren League) will be instrument for creation of provisional government.

(3) Agreement that Yugoslavia will not attempt to dominate the post-coup Albanian government or prevent holding of free elections as soon as possible under UN supervision - announcing publicly such intentions at time of coup, and providing such guarantee as the State Department shall consider adequate assurance of intent.

Resulting group to remain under U.S. control.

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(4) Yugoslavia to agree to formation of joint staff (U.S.-Britain-Yugoslavia-Greece) to accomplish necessary and preferably detailed planning.

(5) Yugoslavia to agree to allow major portion of military operations to be conducted from bases in Yugoslav territory.

(6) Yugoslavia to agree to provide necessary "volunteer" forces, both refugee Albanian and Yugoslav-Albanian needed (when augmented by emigre forces available to West) to accomplish military phase of coup.

(7) Yugoslavia to agree to have all available fighter aircraft on standby alert from D-Day until coup is secure to prevent aerial reinforcement of Hoxha military forces by satellites or Soviets over-flying their territory, -- working out agreement with Greece re coverage of mutual border area.

(8) Yugoslavia to agree to give further operational assistance as mutually developed in detailed planning.

(9) Yugoslavia to agree to resist Soviet or satellite attempts to reinforce Hoxha forces via ground routes through Yugoslav territory.

(10) U.S. to agree to reciprocate by commitments not exceeding the following:

(a) Provide Yugoslavia with necessary jet fighters, radar equipment, ammo, PCL and training to create an effective all-weather fighter force by time coup is initiated.

(b) Provide sufficient equipment, supplies and training to enable Yugoslav forces to resist effectively any satellite invasion.

(c) Maintain U.S. fleet with atomic capability in Eastern Mediterranean.

(d) Commit U.S. military forces (primarily naval and naval

Yugoslavia to issue statement on D-Day that any aircraft over-flying their territory without permission will be considered unfriendly and shot down.

Preferable that U.S. make as few as possible of commitments listed under 1 b((10)) with particular effort to avoid 1 b(10)(d).

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ESSENTIAL

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air) in case of invasion of Yugoslavia by Soviet forces.

(e) Make show of forces, using primarily naval and naval air, in case of reinforcement of Albanian Communists by Soviet forces - without over-flying or attacking Albanian territory.

c. With Greece;

(1) Greece to agree to support coup activity on basis of substantially full revelation (minus specific operational detail unless Greece become member of joint staff).

(2) Greece to agree to renounce publicly on D-Day intentions to press claims for Northern Epirus by force for time being.

(3) Greece to recognize provisional Albanian government as soon as possible.

(4) Greece to have all available fighter aircraft on standby alert from D-Day until coup is secure to prevent aerial reinforcement of Hoxha forces by satellites or Soviets over-flying Greek territory - working out agreement with Yugoslavia re coverage of mutual border area.

(5) Greece to agree to resist Soviet or satellite attempts to reinforce Hoxha forces via ground routes through Greek territory.

(6) U.S. to reciprocate by commitments not exceeding the following:

(a) Provide Greece with necessary jet fighters, radar equipment, ammo, PCL and training to create an all-weather fighter force.

(b) Commit U.S. military forces (primarily naval and naval air) in case of invasion of Greece by Soviet or satellite forces, resulting from Greek participation in coup in compliance with U.S. request.

Greece to allow some operations in connection with coup to be conducted from Greek territory.

Greece to agree to join in coup planning staff with U.S., U.K. and Yugoslavia.

Greece to issue statement on D-Day that any aircraft over-flying their territory without permission will be considered unfriendly and shot down.

Preferable that U.S. make as few as possible of commitments listed under 1 c(6) with particular effort to avoid 1 c(6)(b).

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## ESSENTIAL

### d. With Italy:

(1) Italy to agree to support coup morally on basis of revelation of broad plans.

(2) Italy to renounce publicly on D-Day any intentions to seek special influence in post-coup Albania.

(3) Italy to recognize provisional Albanian government as soon as established.

### e. With France:

France to agree to support coup morally on basis of revelation of broad plans.

### f. With Turkey:

Turkey to agree to support coup morally on basis of revelation of broad plans.

2. Department of Defense must agree to accept risks inherent in coup and prepare to cope with same.

Department of Defense must agree to undertake the equipping and training of Yugoslav and Greek Air Forces for all-weather fighter capability if such a commitment is made by State Department.

## DESIRABLE

France to agree to recognize provisional Albanian government as soon as established.

Turkey to agree to recognize provisional Albanian government as soon as established.

D/D should arrange for naval maneuvers to be in operation near mouth of Adriatic on D-Day and continue until coup is secure in order to prevent Soviet or satellite reinforcement of Hoxha by sea, by declaring mouth of Adriatic unsafe for navigation because of recently "discovered" floating mines.

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3. MSA (see "Desirable" column).

DESIRABLE

MSA should agree to post-coup  
aid program.

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